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In this journal, I previously published a paper discussing how to conduct an analysis 
based on a cluster sample. In that paper, I outlined several widely-adopted alternative 
approaches, and pointed out that such approaches are anyway not needed for 
population figures, and not possible for non-probability samples (Gorard 2007). Thus, 
I queried the prevalence and relevance of complex approaches such as multi-level 
modelling (MLM) for most real-life analyses. I illustrated the lack of substantive 
difference in the results obtained via MLM and other approaches in a number of 
recent studies. And I repeated my challenge (from Gorard 2003a) for those 
advocating the use of MLM to find and publish a real study in which the policy or 
practice implications of the research would differ depending on whether MLM or a 
sensible alternative was used.  
 
Instead of taking up this challenge, Hutchison and Schagen (2008) responded with a 
paper that misrepresents (and even misquotes) what I said, in an attempt to defend 
their favoured technique of MLM. In my reply to them here, I hope to establish their 
misunderstanding of this important topic. This might lead readers to imagine that this 
will be a highly technical paper about a statistical issue. It is not. I also hope to 
establish their misrepresentation of my paper. The issue is one of wider and greater 
concern than the surface argument about whether multi-level modelling is of any 
great value. It is about the kind of intellectual processes we are prepared to endorse as 
a field.i 
 
This paper deals first with areas in which we agree, and then areas in which 
Hutchison and Schagen (2008) simply restate their position, before turning to the 
more substantive consideration of why it is not necessary or appropriate to use multi-
level modelling in most real analytical situations. 
 
 
Where we agree 
 
The first few pages of Hutchison and Schagen (2008), after the summary, are largely 
uncontentious – to me at least since I have written all of it before. Hutchison and 
Schagen should know from my substantive work that much of what I do involves 
stressing and illustrating the differences between models and reality (see Gorard 
2008a, 2008b for current examples). In the past I have had to do this in conflict with 
authors like Hutchison and Schagen who believe that only multi-level modelling, for 
example, can reveal the ‘truth’ of a matter (see below). They should also know this 
from attendance at my BERA sessions on the role of judgement in statistical analysis 
(which they disagreed with at the time, although they now repeat it in substance), and 
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from repeated and welcome attendance at presentations as part of the ESRC RDI 
project that I recently led (www.trials-pp.co.uk). I have used the wind tunnel analogy, 
that they now use, previously in many books and papers, including Gorard with 
Taylor (2004, see chapter seven). I have many times stressed the importance of 
judgement, and that analysis of any kind is an art, not a direct representation of reality 
(e.g. Gorard 2006a). I have often referred to methods as a toolkit, and through my 
own research I regularly use a much wider range of tools from that kit than either 
Schagen or Hutchison. Even the quotation from George Box with which they preface 
their paper has been used by me several times previously. See, for example, Sloane 
and Gorard (2003) where the quotation appears as the frontispiece of my paper, just 
as it does five years later in the paper by Hutchison and Schagen (2008). It is hard to 
see, knowing as I do that they have both heard me discuss these ideas for years, how 
they might believe that the first part of their paper, which simply echoes my own 




Re-statement as argumentative technique 
 
For much of the rest of their paper, it becomes clear that, despite their apparent 
newfound agreement with my prior writings, Hutchison and Schagen (2008) do 
intend their preamble to set the scene somehow for contradicting my 2007 paper. But 
they do not explain how or why. To a large extent, Hutchison and Schagen (2008) 
contradict Gorard (2007) without offering any evidence, argument or even sources to 
back up their assertions. They simply state that I am wrong. In doing so they make the 
mistake of assuming as fact that which they are trying to establish in the first place, so 
replacing logic with dogmatism. If we all did this it would be the end of intellectual 
endeavour. Recall that my paper was questioning the value of widespread use of 
multilevel modelling, and that their paper was intended to show that ‘there is much in 
his [i.e. my] line of reasoning which is misleading or misconceived’ (Hutchison and 
Schagen 2008, p.11). Their paper is littered with brief quotations from my paper 
followed by brief contradictions such as ‘this is wholly inaccurate’ and ‘this is 
incorrect’ (both p.17) without any attempt to justify their claim. In their minds, 
readers should, apparently, just take their word for it.  
 
Sometimes this invalid form of argumentation appears in slightly more disguised 
form. For example Hutchison and Schagen (2008, p.16) write in response to my 
request for a comparison of the value of multilevel modelling with other techniques: 
 
But the Hutchison article [Hutchison 2003] relates to the influences of one 
factor at one level on another at a different level, a situation for which 
multilevel modelling is specifically designed. What would be the point of using 
an inferior technique? 
 
Here they are merely assuming from the outset that which they, presumably, seek to 
establish - namely that other techniques are ‘inferior’ to MLM. The paper is awash 
with this approach. See also, on the topic of class sizes (Hutchison and Schagen 2008, 




Only with a more sophisticated, value-added model do we start to be able to 
clear away the distracting factors and begin to see the true effect of reduced 
class sizes. 
 
There are at least four problems here. First, they are simply restating their position. 
We must do it their way to get the ‘true’ answer, is their stance. Second, their claim 
does not relate specifically to MLM. Value-added models do not require MLM (see 
the official DCSF model, in Gorard 2006b). Third, value-added (with or without 
MLM) is not the ‘only’ way to sort out the apparently perplexing finding that pupils 
in larger classes have better results. It could be done in a host of ways including 
contextually (Gorard 2000) or via a randomised controlled trial (Cook and Gorard 
2007). Fourth, and most hypocritically, Hutchison and Schagen (2008) use the term 
‘true’ to describe the findings as they advocate them. But elsewhere (p.17) they 
lambast me for using the term ‘incorrect’ since, according to them, that ‘illustrates a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the purpose of modelling and statistical analysis’. 
 
A further example of their circular argumentative approach says: 
 
Only with the appropriate analysis tools and models do we have a chance of 
making progress – but as we start to do analysis we begin to find that simple 
models do not do justice to complex data. And recognition of the multilevel 
structure helps us to organize our analysis. [Hutchison and Schagen 2008, p.15] 
 
Again this passage merely restates their initial position. They offer no justification for 
these substantial and unlikely claims – either here or elsewhere in the paper. How 
could they know that we ‘only’ have any chance to progress using what they consider 
to be appropriate tools and models? Was there no progress before 1986 and the 
advent of hierarchical linear modelling? Was there no progress after 1986 except via 
MLM? The assumption that complex data requires complex forms of analysis may be 
seductive to some readers but has no basis in either logic or evidence. Helpful 
insights might come equally from simple consideration of complex situations and not 
only from complex considerations. Of course it is true that looking at clustered 
datasets in terms of multiple levels can be helpful. I said as much in the paper they are 
purportedly arguing with. But it is not necessary to use the specific technique of 
multilevel modelling to recognise that structure. And it is inappropriate for Hutchison 
and Schagen to suggest here that it is, because Gorard (2007) outlines and references 
a variety of widely used and accepted alternatives. More importantly, there may be 
important clusters within any complex dataset that cannot be handled by multilevel 
modelling (which is merely hierarchical in nature). Sex, social class, and ethnicity, for 
example, are important theoretical clusters within many social science datasets. But 
they are not handled as clusters by multilevel modelling. So, in my opinion, not using 
multilevel modelling can be liberating and more insightful for an analyst because no 
analytical preference is given to hierarchical clusters like schools and teaching units, 
over equally relevant but non-hierarchical ones like sex and ethnicity.ii 
 
 
Evading the comparison with multi-level modelling 
 
In my paper I put forward arguments for and then against the use of multi-level 
modelling. I ended it by asking for clear evidence of where MLM helps us, because 
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‘if MLM has the benefits described at the start of this paper then analysts should be 
able to devise a way of illustrating them’ (Gorard 2007, p.234). In their paper, 
Hutchison and Schagen (2008, p.16, italics added) say: 
 
Gorard argues (230) that he [Hutchison] should have used both OLS and 
multilevel modelling, and compared the results, as apparently suggested in an 
article published at or about the same time (Gorard 2003a). 
 
This is an interesting passage because of what it reveals about their cavalier use of 
evidence. I have many times asked that both MLM and simpler analyses are 
published together for a period so that we can judge empirically what we gain and 
lose through the use of each. In the paper cited by Hutchison and Schagen one 
passage was as follows: 
 
What Plewis and Fielding have failed to do in promoting what they term the 
‘potential’ of MLM is to show it leading to any practical discovery in education 
that could not have been obtained otherwise. This is a key empirical point (and 
note that this is very different from simply showing that MLM has been used in 
many useful pieces of work). Perhaps we should ask journals to print both the 
MLM and alternate analyses in all relevant papers for some time so that we can 
gain a clearer picture of the practical difference it makes? [Gorard 2003a, 
pp.420-421] 
 
Where then does the word ‘apparently’ come from in the quotation from Hutchison 
and Schagen (2008, p.16)? They have read my 2003 paper and so must know that the 
suggestion is there. 
 
Hutchison and Schagen (2008, p.8) also say: 
 
On page 230, he [Gorard] criticizes Schagen and Schagen (2005) for not finding 
anything new using multilevel modelling…. The fact that careful analysis of a 
more comprehensive dataset gave similar results to those obtained with a 
previous dataset should not be a cause for criticism. 
 
I will quote my original passage at length to be clear here. What I said was: 
 
In a study of the impact of school diversity, Schagen and Schagen (2005) state 
that their paper ‘acts as a case study of a piece of research which illustrates the 
power of combining multilevel modelling techniques with the rich linked 
national data sets now becoming available’ (p.309). In the paper, the authors 
explain the great advantages of using MLM rather than simpler forms of 
regression, and also explain that the quality of datasets available to education 
research of this type is improving year-on-year. Thus, the reader is led to expect 
that their ‘illustration’ of the ‘power’ of MLM will lead to new and even 
unexpected findings. In fact, nothing of the sort happens. The authors conclude 
that ‘the research described above replicated research undertaken earlier, but 
was based on a different dataset (2001 GCSE outcomes linked with 1996 KS2 
levels) and used a wider range of outcomes and an improved methodology. The 




Nowhere am I critical that their findings are similar to those previously. This 
similarity across studies is a very likely occurrence, and presumably outside the 
control of researchers anyway (if research evidence means anything at all). My point 
was simply that the paper is presented by them very forcefully as an illustration of 
powerful data allied with powerful techniques. Schagen and Schagen (2005, p.309) 
said, for example: 
 
The advent of large-scale matched data sets, linking pupils’ attainment across 
key stages, give new opportunities to explore the effects of school 
organisational factors on pupil performance. Combined with currently available 
sophisticated and efficient software for multilevel analysis, it offers educational 
researchers the chance to develop objective evidence about issues both old and 
new. 
and 
it acts as a case study of a piece of research which illustrates the power of 
combining multilevel modelling techniques with the rich linked national data 
sets now available. [p.309] 
 
So what is the impact of this alliance of better data with sophisticated contemporary 
software for a refined multi-level analysis? The authors themselves say: 
 
the findings from the latest analysis were broadly consistent with those from the 
earlier research. [Schagen and Schagen 2005, p.325] 
 
I raised this example in the section of my 2007 paper where I ask again what it is that 
multi-level modelling (MLM) has found out for us that we could not have found out 
by other, and simpler, means. None of the examples I found and quoted had found 
anything substantially different using multi-level modelling. Hutchison and Schagen 
(2008) try to evade the challenge of showing that MLM is of any practical value by 
claiming that I was being critical of their replicated findings. The issue for those who 
stand to gain professionally and financially from the use of MLM is quite simple. All 
they have to do is point to examples where the use of MLM has led to a clear analytic 
gain. The paper by Schagen and Schagen (2005) is, patently and in their own words, 
not such an example. And an artificial example will not do. Even an example of a 
different result gained from using MLM is not sufficient, by itself. They have to show 
that it is substantially (pragmatically) different and better than results obtained any 
other way. I have never seen such an example. If there were one, Hutchison and 
Schagen (2008) could have ended the matter by presenting and explaining it in their 
paper. I assume, therefore, that they do not have one, and I recommend that readers 
assume the same, until Hutchison and Schagen produce one.  
 
In fact, Schagen must be rather confused here anyway since he has already published 
his agreement that using MLM is not always necessary. To remind readers, in my 
2007 paper I quoted the following passage from his prior paper which says: 
 
In principle, this model should be fitted using multilevel modelling techniques, 
to allow for the clustering of pupils within school and to estimate more accurate 
standard errors. However, for this paper we have used ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression – this is likely to give very similar results for the modelling 




Yet in addition to the quotation above about only being able to make progress with 
MLM, Hutchison and Schagen (2008, p.13) say: 
 
The choice of OLS or MLM is one of many that a modeller has to make… If 
there is any chance of non-zero variance at higher levels either in overall level 
of outcome or in slopes, then it makes sense to run a multilevel analysis – if 
these variances are in fact zero, the model will indicate this and the results will 
be essentially identical to those from OLS, but no harm will have been done. On 
the other hand, if the variances are non-zero, then different results are likely to 
be produced, which in general are likely to be more realistic.  
 
So, Schagen’s advice to you and I is that we should run MLM because it may be 
important if there is any chance of non-zero variance at higher levels. But in practice, 
as he admits in his 2006 paper, he himself does not do this. He even admits that for all 
practical purposes MLM and OLS will give pretty much the same results. Which is 
precisely the main point I was making in my 2007 paper. Why bother with the anti-
democratic complexity of MLM when a simpler analysis will lead to the same 
practical findings? 
 
Hutchison and Schagen ignore most of my suggestions for legitimate alternatives to 
multi-level modelling which is, after all, only one of the widespread ways for dealing 
with a cluster randomised sample, and they simply deny the rest. These alternatives 
come from a variety of informed and highly-regarded sources – such as my colleague 
Martin Bland, Professor of Health Statistics at the University of York, writing in the 
BMJ (cited in my 2007 paper), and the BMA Consort Guidelines for the analysis of 
data from cluster randomised samples. Of course, these and many other sources like 
them that allow both MLM and alternatives might be wrong. But if Hutchison and 
Schagen dispute these authorities then they need to make clear to their readers that 
this is what they are doing, and then explain why.  
 
Instead what they do is repeat the bold part of the following section of my paper:  
 
There is no necessity to use MLM in any analytic situation. Perhaps the simplest 
way to respect the clustering in data is to analyse only at the cluster level. In 
fact, according to established statistical procedures this is what should be done 
anyway. If pupils are clustered within schools, for example, and schools are 
selected to take part in a survey, and the survey instrument is then 
completed by a number of pupils in each of these schools, then the sample 
is of schools (not pupils) and can quite properly be analysed as a sample of 
schools. Better, where the analyst has access to both individual and grouped 
data, is to analyse the data at each level separately (see, for example, Gorard et 
al. 2003). This is a very effective and perfectly safe procedure. Perhaps the 
simplest ways to avoid the supposedly terrible fate awaiting analysts who under-
estimate their standard errors or confidence intervals through not using MLM 
include increasing the sample size (especially the number of clusters), using a 
proper random sample instead, using population figures instead, multiplying the 
standard errors by a weighting to reflect the estimated scale of the bias (or 
design effect), or – most simply – increasing the threshold for significance from 




They then say (of the bold part) 
 
This is wholly inaccurate. It is possible to envisage some situations in which 
this might be true, but in general this would be a sample of pupils. [Hutchison 
and Schagen 2008, p.17] 
 
It is hard to imagine how they came to write this, and how it was allowed to be 
published. First and most obviously, their statement contains an internal 
contradiction. What I said cannot be both ‘wholly inaccurate’ and ‘might be true’. 
Second, of course, if it might be true (even if only in some situations) then such an 
approach ‘can’ be used – and that is all I said (it ‘can quite properly be analysed as a 
sample of schools’). Third, if pupils within schools had been selected randomly then a 
significance-based statistical analysis of pupils could, indeed, be undertaken. But this 
is not the situation. Where schools are selected as the cases (as stated clearly in the 
quotation from my paper above), and measurements are taken from a number of 
pupils per school to generate estimates of school-level values then the sample (and 
any ‘uncertainty’ as Hutchison and Schagen term it) can only be at the school level.  
 
As an analogy, consider a random sample of individual pupils selected to measure 
their heights. If we take several estimates of each pupil’s height using different 
personnel and different measuring devices at different times of day we may then have 
a better averaged estimate of the underlying hypothetical true heights for each 
individual. But our sample is still of pupils, and any significance-based analysis need 
only be done at that level. We have, it is true, a kind of sample of estimated heights 
for each pupil as well, but we have no reason to believe that variation between 
personnel, devices or contexts is random rather than biased in nature. One researcher 
might always measure to the top of any threshold line on a ruler, and another to the 
bottom or middle. One device might intrinsically tend to measure shorter than 
another. Pupils might tend to shrink slightly during the day, and so on. These are not 
random differences. Therefore, we need not and should not use a significance-based 
analysis at the within-pupil estimate level. Instead, we can quite properly, and as 
outlined in my original paper, analyse data at both levels using appropriate techniques 
for each. To treat the estimates as random would be unscientific in throwing away 
what we might know about them (that the shortest estimate for each pupil was 
regularly from the same instrument, or whatever). Multi-level modelling is neither 
relevant nor useful for this situation. 
 
Hutchison and Schagen (2008, p.13) claim that two simple regression models at both 
individual and school level ‘would be much more complex’ than the equivalent multi-
level model. In my original paper I directed readers to areas of work (mine and 
others) where both approaches were used. In my opinion, an MLM analysis and 
explanation is considerably more complex than the two ordinary regressions. I think 
that others, including academics like Carol FitzGibbon and Lindsay Patterson (both 
cited in my 2007 paper) and all research users and practitioners I have ever consulted, 
agree with me here. If Hutchison and Schagen really believe that MLM is simpler to 
do and explain then they could have illustrated this in their paper, or referenced 
somewhere that they have seen it done. As with their un-tested and un-illustrated 
claim that MLM gives better results, they do not provide either an example or a 





A reprise of basic statistical ideas 
 
In Gorard (2007) I question those, like Hutchison (2003), who quite properly use 
population data but then look for significance, standard errors, confidence intervals 
and the like as though trying to generalise from a random sample to their population. 
Schagen and Schagen (2005, p.316) make the same kind of mistake. Although this 
error of imagining that sampling theory and its creations (like significance) can be 
applied to non-random non-samples is widespread, it is still wrong. Perhaps the 
easiest way to see this error is to imagine, when Hutchison (2003, p.38) talks about 
‘significant’, what he could actually mean by this in the context of a full cohort of 
data from one LEA. He would not, presumably, imagine that he could generalise 
statistically from this one LEA to all others – given that he has only one case and it 
was selected non-randomly anyway. He clearly could not want to generalise to other 
pupils of the same age within the LEA, since there are no others in the LEA to 
generalise to. Statistical analysis does not allow us to generalise from actual cases to 
imaginary cases (such as future cohorts who might be very different). So, statistical 
significance is irrelevant to the kind of analysis conducted by Hutchison (2003). 
 
The reaction of Hutchison and Schagen (2008) to my reasoned position – that 
significance has a place in the toolbox but not for use with populations – is: 
 
Clearly the practice of significance testing has been grossly misused…. 
However, the strong reaction to this which would sweep all use away is 
excessive. [p.14] 
 
They seem unable to distinguish between some and none here (something of a key 
problem for a numeric analyst). Saying, as I and many other commentators do, that 
significance tests are of no value with population data is not to ‘sweep all use away’ 
but to retain their widespread use with random samples, whether for modelling or not. 
 
A good random sample is an excellent heuristic for a population, and the creations of 
sampling theory such as significance are there to help ensure that we are not misled 
by this resource-efficient process of sampling (by what Hutchison and Schagen refer 
to as ‘uncertainty’ which, of course, does not apply to population data). Therefore, it 
is obviously possible to model, statistically or otherwise, with population data, and 
using a population is analytically preferable to having a random sample. Anything 
that can be done with a model from a sample can also be done, better, with the 
population that the sample would otherwise seek to generalise to. Hutchison and 
Schagen (2008), among others, worry about how we would analyse data from 
populations if not using derivatives from sampling theory. This misses the point that 
we use sampling theory only because we have a sample. If we have a population we 
do not need, and could make no sense of, things like confidence intervals. We can use 
judgement to retain or eliminate variables from our model or decide which models to 
pursue in exactly the same way for populations as we must do when we have a 
sample (once we have disposed of the additional complication with a sample of 
assessing its generality). We could use a variety of approaches to help our judgement 
in selecting variables for models, such as ‘effect’ size (the amount of variance 
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explained) or predictions from theory, none of which depend on statistical 
significance.  
 
Hutchison and Schagen (2008, p.15) use the recent emergence of the PLASC/NPD 
dataset to try and back up their point that: 
 
In fact, more and better data needs more sophisticated modelling approaches in 
order to interpret and understand it.  
 
But nowhere do they explain how this follows. I regularly use the PLASC/NPD 
dataset. Sometimes I use complex models and sometimes simple arithmetic (Gorard 
et al. 2008). The latter is just as effective in its place. Because PLASC/NPD is for an 
entire population its analysis is simpler than other datasets in many ways because 
there is no issue of significance, confidence intervals or standard errors to deal with 
before looking for potential patterns and trends. If we find the mean GCSE points 
scores in maths for boys and girls, we do not need and cannot use the panoply of 
traditional statistics to help us decide whether one mean is larger than another. It 
either is or it is not. In that year, for that assessment, as recorded by these data, the 
scores are what they are. Making the analysis multivariate to include area, age, FSM 
eligibility, other subjects and so on does not change this basic simplicity.  
 
Of course, we should not just assume that any difference, pattern or trend we see in 
PLASC/NPD data is of any scientific value or practical consequence. Like all such 
datasets, PLASC/NPD has limitations (see Gorard 2008c). For example, in the 2006 
PLASC there were 3,371 cases with no ethnicity recorded from a total of 601,230 
pupils at Key Stage 4. This does not sound like a large proportion until we consider 
the NPD which has 664,630 pupils at Key Stage 4. This means that a minimum of 
66,771 cases (more than 10% of the total) appear to have no recorded ethnicity, and 
we have to add to this total those cases unmatched across PLASC and NPD. What all 
of these inevitable limitations of PLASC/NPD (and all other such datasets) have in 
common is that they are not random events. To propose, as Hutchison and Schagen 
do, that we can allocate them to a bucket of all unknown random factors is far-fetched 
and based on a false premise. They say of multi-level models (p.14, italics added): 
 
The random part of the model is not necessarily so because of random sampling. 
But just because we have constructed it to include all those relationships and 
influences which we do not otherwise understand. 
 
This is their argument for using statistical testing on PLASC/NPD data, and part of 
their ‘reasoning’ for the need to use multi-level modelling. But I feel in contrast that 
we must use what we do know about missing data (variables, cases, and values) to 
help judge the importance of any pattern we find. One of the things that we, but not 
Hutchison and Schagen apparently, know from decades of social research is that we 
can have no reason to assume that missing data is random. Where this has been 
possible to test, data is more likely be missing from stratified subsets of society – 
those who cannot read and complete official forms, those without a fixed address, or 
those who just miss out on benefit thresholds, for example (see Gorard 2003b). None 
of this is amenable to fixing via significance tests, or indeed by MLM. I am afraid 
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i Whenever I have written previously about multi-level modelling, its advocates have resorted to 
amending what I wrote, quoting the incorrect text and then arguing with it in a way that relies for any 
efficacy on readers not caring enough about the truth of the matter to read the full accounts. 
Presumably this is easier for MLM advocates than actually discussing what I did write. I have 
described this process of distorting evidence, by writers such as Plewis and Fielding (2003) and Noden 
and Goldstein (2007), as ‘the antithesis of intellectual endeavour’ (Gorard and Fitz 2006). Noden and 
Goldstein (2007), for example, attempted to deflect criticism of their faulty arithmetic in a previous 
paper where they calculated a national average by adding together scores for each LEA without regard 
to the size of each LEA. They did so by claiming that I had made the same mistake in another paper 
(Taylor and Gorard 2001). I invite all interested readers to check the facts out for themselves. They will 
see that nowhere in the paper do I find a national average for anything. I do use unequal size 
enumeration districts and unequal size schools as organisational units but their size is automatically 
taken into account when aggregating to LEA-level. Therefore I did not, indeed could not, make the 
same serious arithmetic error as Noden and Goldstein. 
 
Hutchison and Schagen (2008) appear to approve of such misquotations and distortions by citing a 
paper by Plewis and Fielding (2003) who used this dishonest and anti-intellectual technique of mis-
quoting widely, despite the fact that Hutchison and Schagen also cite my response to Plewis and 
Fielding (Gorard 2003a), and so must have read about these inaccuracies. In case any readers are in any 
doubt about how blatant these examples are, please follow the references in Gorard and Fitz (2006) and 
read the original papers. I have to assume that Hutchison and Schagen either have not done so, or 
cannot see what Plewis and Fielding (2003) did wrong. Perhaps this is because, like them, Plewis and 
Fielding were seeking to defend the widespread use of MLM. If such apparent leaders in their field 
have to resort to misrepresentation to defend their position, and if peer-reviewers and editors cannot 
spot it when they do, then education research faces a poor future. This is partly why I say that the issue 
underlying this paper is important, and about more than whether MLM produces better results than 
OLS. 
 
ii On the topic of clustering, Hutchison and Schagen (2008, p.16) say: 
He [Gorard] also states that: ‘a girl in one class may be much more similar to a girl in another 
class than to a boy in another class. And so on’. Again this is a misunderstanding. As an analogy 
of why this is incorrect, for example it is known that boys are on average taller after puberty 
than girls. This statement of averages does not imply that all boys are taller than girls.  
There are many problems with this passage. First, the quotation is wrong (see footnote i). What I 
actually wrote was ‘A girl in one class may be more similar to a girl in another class than to a boy in 
her own class. And so on.’ (Gorard 2007, pp.227-228). Second, presumably both versions – what I said 
and what they misquote me as saying – are actually perfectly reasonable. A girl might, in many 
respects, be more similar to another girl of the same age in a different teaching group than to a boy 
whether in the same or a different teaching group. How can Hutchison and Schagen call this 
‘incorrect’? Third, what is their ‘analogy’ intended to show? It reminds me that boys might tend to be 
taller than girls of the same age. This would increase the probability that, in terms of height at least, 
two girls might be more similar than a girl and boy - whatever teaching groups they were in, since 
height is not usually a criterion for allocating pupils to classrooms. This would seem to me to agree 
both with what I actually said and with what they thought I said. I cannot imagine how they think this 
any kind of argument for the use of MLM. 
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